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We investigate the longest-path attacks on complex networks. Specifically, we remove approxi-
mately the longest simple path from a network iteratively until there are no paths left in the network.
We propose two algorithms, the random augmenting approach (RPA) and the Hamilton-path based
approach (HPA), for finding the approximately longest simple path in a network. Results demon-
strate that steps of longest-path attacks increase with network density linearly for random networks,
while exponentially increasing for scale-free networks. The more homogeneous the degree distribu-
tion is, the more fragile the network, which is totally different from the previous results of node
or edge attacks. HPA is generally more efficient than RPA in the longest-path attacks of complex
networks. These findings further help us understand the vulnerability of complex systems, better
protect complex systems, and design more tolerant complex systems.
I. INTRODUCTION
Vulnerability is one of the fundamental properties in
many nature and man-made complex systems[1–4]. For
instance, genetic defects induce cell lesions[5], router
failures interrupt the Internet[6], incidents or terrorist
attacks cause collapse of public transport systems[7],
and malfunction of a power station results in large-scale
blackouts[8]. The vulnerability of complex systems is
determined by the underlying networks in which nodes
represent individuals in complex systems and edges rep-
resent the interactions of individuals. In past decades,
many breakthroughs have been made on understanding
individual components’ disturbance’s effects on the over-
all function of complex networks. Albert et al [9] found
that the Internet and WWW (World Wide Web) are
very robust against random failures, but quite fragile in
intended attacks. This robust yet fragile property was
confirmed in much larger maps of the WWW as well as
many other scale-free networks[1], and percolation pro-
cesses on model networks were introduced to explain this
property[10, 11]. Since then many researchers studied the
robustness of model networks and real-world networks
subject to node attacks and edge attacks[1, 2], in which
nodes or edges are removed in order of degree[12, 13]
or other centrality measures such as betweenness[14, 15],
eigenvector[16], PageRank[17], etc. A few localized fail-
ures or attacks may cause cascading failures and lead
to breakdown of the whole system which has been ob-
served in Internet[18, 19], power grids[20, 21], financial
systems[22], etc. Recently, researchers studied robust-
ness of temporal or time-varying networks by extending
the measures of centrality and robustness with tempo-
ral properties[23, 24]. Furthermore, current attention
focuses on the percolation processes on multiplex or in-
terdependent networks which better model catastrophic
events in power grids, transport systems and many other
interdependent systems[8, 25, 26]. However, attacks are
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not merely limited to node or edge attacks that have been
widely studied in the literature. For instance, hurricanes
always have a large-scale effect on the public transport
networks, terrorists usually prefer much larger scale at-
tacks, and drugs always affect many targets. Therefore,
we need to understand the effect of attacks on larger
parts of complex networks other than nodes and edges,
like path attacks. A simple path composed of nodes and
edges is a common subpart of a network. In this context,
“path” always means “simple path” which indicates that
a node appears at most once in a path. This restriction
is consistent with the attacks problem. In a network, a
straightforward measure of paths is path length. There-
fore, a natural question is how removals of the longest
paths affect the function of a network. Finding the
longest paths in general graphs is a well-known NP-hard
problem in the literature[27]. Many approximation al-
gorithms are proposed to approximate the longest paths
including color-coding method[28], divide and conquer
approach[29], algebraic approach[30], etc. In this letter,
we propose two algorithms, RPA and HPA, to find the
approximately longest paths during the attack processes.
The efficiency of these two algorithms in the attacks is
determined by the decay rates of the largest components
in networks. The robustness of model networks and real-
world networks to longest-path attacks are reflected by
the steps of the iterative attacks.
II. MODEL OF LONGEST-PATH ATTACKS
In a large network, there is usually a huge number of
paths which is much larger than the number of nodes
and edges. In some sense, paths can be thought of as
the combinations of nodes and edges. When attacking a
network, we prefer to remove the critical paths so that
the removal of these paths significantly degenerate the
function of the network. There are plenty of centrality
measures in literature[1], but most of them are for nodes
and edges, few are connected with paths. Path length, a
natural measure for a path, is defined as the number of
edges in a path. In our path-attack process, each time
2we remove the longest path from the network based on
specified algorithms. Note that when attacking a path,
we just remove all its edges from the network, but keep
all its nodes in the network. The removal of longest path
continues until there are no paths in the networks. In
fact there are no edges in the final network, since edges
are paths of length 1, and they would be removed from
the network if there were any left.
III. MEASURES OF LONGEST-PATH ATTACKS
The size of the largest component in a network reflects
the communication capability of a network. Therefore
we compute the size of largest component S during each
step of the longest-path attacks, which indicates the ef-
ficiency of an approximating algorithm. The larger the
decay rate of the largest component, the more efficient
the approximating algorithm. Also, we count the total
step of the longest-path attacks T , which reflects the tol-
erance of a network subject to longest-path attacks, and
more steps means a more robust network against longest-
path attacks.
IV. ALGORITHM FOR APPROXIMATING
THE LONGEST PATH
In each iteration of the attacks process, we need to find
the longest path in the corresponding network, which is
a famous NP-hard problem. Here we present two algo-
rithms, random path augmenting approach (RPA) and
Hamilton-path based augmenting approach (HPA), to
find the approximate longest path in a network.
A. Random path augmenting approach
RPA is a very simple algorithm for constructing a path
in a network. First, RPA randomly selects a node from
the network as the root node. Second, RPA chooses a
neighboring node of the root node as the second node
of the path, and then chooses a neighboring node of the
second node as the third node of the path, and so on. The
path augmenting process continues until it cannot find a
new appropriate node. The main procedure of RPA is as
follows:
(1) Maintain a path P which is a node sequence (ini-
tially null), and node set V0 (initially null).
(2) Randomly select a node r as the root node.
(3) Append r to the end of P , and add r to V0.
(4) Find a neighboring node of r named q, such that
q /∈ V0.
(5) IF q exists, take q as r, return to (3). Otherwise,
the algorithm stops.
FIG. 1. An example for illustrating the idea of HPA.
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FIG. 2. Size of the largest component S vs. time step of the
longest-path attack t for (a) the random network and (b) the
scale-free network.
B. Hamilton-path based augmenting approach
HPA employs the idea of approximating the Hamilton
path in a network[31]. Initially, HPA randomly selects
a node as the root node, and augments a path as long
as possible in both directions of the root node. In each
iteration, HPA first generates a circle graph based on the
current augmenting path. Then HPA makes the circle
graph a new augmenting path by introducing an arbi-
trary node connected to the circle graph, and starts a
new augmenting process. The procedure of HPA is as
follows:
(1) Maintain a path P that is a node sequence (initially
null).
(2) Randomly select a node r as the root node, and let
P = 〈r〉.
(3) Augment a path in both directions from the cur-
rent path P as far as possible, and obtain a new
3path P ′. Assuming P = 〈u0, · · · , v0〉, then P ′ =
〈u, · · · , u0, · · · , v0, · · · , v〉. Note that a node is al-
lowed to appear once in a path.
(4) Find an edge 〈x, y〉 in P ′ such that edge 〈u, y〉 and
edge 〈x, v〉 exist. If edge 〈x, y〉 is found, then delete
it, and add edge 〈u, y〉 and edge 〈x, v〉 to P ′, which
makes P ′ a circle graph, shown in the fig. 1. If
edge 〈x, y〉 is not found, the algorithm ends, and
P ′ is the resulting path. Note that if the network
satisfies Dirac constraints and P ′ is not a Hamilton
path, then 〈x, y〉 exists (see theorem 1 in Appendix
A).
(5) Find a node z, such that z is not included in the
circle graph, but z connects to an arbitrary node w
in the circle. If z is found, then delete an arbitrary
edge incident to w from the circle graph, and add
edge 〈z, w〉 to the circle graph. As a result, the cir-
cle graph becomes a longer path P ′′, as shown in
fig. 1. If z is not found, the algorithm ends, and P ′
is the resulting path. Note that if the network satis-
fies the Dirac constraints and P ′ is not a Hamilton
path, then z exits (see theorem 2 in Appendix B).
(6) Take P ′′ as P , and return to (3).
The circle graph and the augment path, generated in
the intermediate stage of HPA, become larger with the
increasing iteration times. We infer that if the network
is dense enough (satisfying the Dirac constraints), then
the resulting path explored by HPA is a Hamilton path,
which is exactly the longest path in the network.
C. Space and time complexity of the two
algorithms
Assume there are n nodes and m edges in a network.
For one iteration, RPA runs in O(n) space constantly and
runs in O(n) time in the worst case, while HPA runs in
O(n) space and O(n2) time in the worst case. For many
iterations, RPA only runs in O(m) time, while HPA only
runs in O(⌊m/n⌋ ∗ n2) time, which are irrelevant with
the specific iteration times. More detailed analysis of
computing complexity for RPA and HPA is presented in
Appendix C.
V. SIMULATION RESULTS
In this part, we show the results of longest-path at-
tacks for model networks and real-world networks. The
Erdo¨s-Re´nyi (ER) model[32] and the static model[33] are
employed to generate the random networks and scale-free
networks respectively. The statistics of the real-world
networks are shown in table. 1.
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FIG. 3. (a) Total attack steps T vs. network size N , and
(b) total attack steps T vs. average degree 〈k〉 for random
networks. The results are the average of 104 independent
runs.
A. Model networks
We first investigate decrease of size of the largest com-
ponent S during the iterative longest-path attacks. In
fig. 2, we clearly see that, S decreases with time step
t almost linearly, and fast in the first stage, and slowly
in the final stage. The behavior of S is similar in both
the random network and the scale-free network. The ef-
ficiency of RPA and HPA is different which is inferred
from the corresponding decay rates of S. HPA is more
efficient than RPA since HPA has a much smaller S for
a specific t, which is found in both the random network
and the scale-free network.
Then we investigate the total attack steps T of model
networks for the two algorithms, shown in fig. 3 and
fig. 4. T increases linearly with network’s size N for
the two algorithms on both random networks (fig. 3(a))
and scale-free networks (fig. 4(a) and fig. 4(b)). For a
given N , T of HPA is always smaller than that of RPA.
T increases with average degree 〈k〉 linearly for random
networks (fig. 3(b)), while exponentially for scale-free
networks (fig. 4(c) and fig. 4(d)). However, when the
power-law parameter γ = 7, T increases linearly as shown
in fig. 4(c) and fig. 4(d). This is because the hetero-
geneity of the degree distribution of scale-free networks
decrease with the power-law parameter γ[33]. Therefore,
when γ is large enough, the scale-free networks are actu-
ally random networks. The increase of T with 〈k〉 indi-
cates that the denser the network, the more robust the
network is to longest path attacks. Also for specific 〈k〉,
T of HPA is always smaller than that of RPA. From fig.
4(e) and fig. 4(f), we see that T decreases with the power-
law parameter γ of scale-free networks. This means that
the more homogeneous the degree distribution, the more
fragile the network is to longest-path attacks, which is
completely opposite to the previous results of node or
edge attacks[4, 9]. Furthermore, we obtain from fig. 3
and fig. 4 that the networks are generally more robust to
RPA than to HPA, which is inferred from the behavior
of T , and holds for both random networks and scale-free
networks.
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FIG. 5. Size of the largest component S vs. time step of the
longest-path attack t for real-world networks.
B. Real-world networks
We also demonstrate the behavior of the largest com-
ponent S in the longest-path attacks and the total steps
of attacks T for real-world networks (table 1). In fig. 5,
generally the size of the largest component S decreases
with time step t linearly, which is similar in model net-
works. However, the fluctuations in the curves of some
real-world networks are clear. HPA is more efficient than
RPA for real-world networks, since HPA always has a
much smaller S for a specified t shown in fig. 5. The ro-
TABLE I. Attack steps T for real-world networks.
NAME NODES EDGES RPA HPA
facebook 4039 88234 3486 1953
Food web 128 2106 79 66
Kohonen 4470 12731 1874 1214
metabolic 453 4596 254 179
Gnutella08 6301 20777 2853 1920
Power 4941 6594 1976 1487
Router 5022 6258 2555 1890
Wiki-Vote 7115 103689 3976 2435
Yeast 2375 11693 1250 848
SciMet 3084 10416 1240 858
USAir 1532 2126 233 147
polbooks 105 441 63 43
karate 34 78 22 14
Jazz 198 5484 112 82
C. elegans 297 2359 27 22
adjnoun 112 425 58 40
bustness of real-world networks to longest-paths attacks
is reflected by the corresponding total steps of attacks
T , shown in table 1. We obtain that real-world networks
are more fragile to HPA than to RPA, since HPA has a
much smaller T than RPA.
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSIONS
In summary, we investigate the robustness of com-
plex networks, including model networks and real-world
networks, which are subject to iterative attacks on the
longest paths. Two algorithms are proposed to approxi-
5mate the longest paths during the attacks. We compare
the efficiency of the two algorithms by the decay rate
of the largest components, and determine the robustness
of the networks by the total attack steps in the longest-
path attacks process. Specifically, we obtain that, total
attack steps increase exponentially with network density
for scale-free networks, while remaining linear for ran-
dom networks. Total attack steps increase linearly with
network size for both random networks and scale-free
networks. For scale-free networks, the more heteroge-
neous the degree distribution, the more robust the net-
works are against longest-path attacks, which are totally
different from the previous results of node or edge at-
tacks. Note that finding the exact longest simple path
in a general network is NP-hard. We only approximate
the longest paths using two approximating algorithms.
There should be more efficient approximating algorithms
emerging in the future. We only investigate effects of
the longest paths on the robustness of complex networks.
However, our work may shed some light on the influence
of longest path on the spread[34, 35], synchronization[36],
control[37, 38], and other network dynamics.
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Appendix A: Theorem 1
Theorem 1: For any node s in the network, if d(s) ≥
⌈|V |/2⌉ (Dirac constraints), d(s) is the degree of s, V is
the node set of the network, then the edge 〈x, y〉 in step
(4) of HPA exists.
Proof : According to the constraints, we have d(u) ≥
⌈|V |/2⌉, and d(v) ≥ ⌈|V |/2⌉. Since u and v are the two
end nodes of P ′, which is the intermediate maximum
augmenting path, all the neighbors of u and v should be
on P ′. Based on the inclusion-exclusion principle, we can
easily obtain that edge 〈x, y〉 exists. The explanation is
as follows:
(1) If we take the node positions in P ′ as vacancies,
then there are at most |V | vacancies denoted by
a1, a2, . . . , a|V |. Once an arbitrary neighbor node
of u takes one of the vacancies ai, then ai−1 can not
be occupied by any neighbor node of v. (Otherwise,
nodes in ai−1 and ai form the node pair 〈x, y〉 we
need.)
(2) Since d(u) ≥ ⌈|V |/2⌉, the neighbor nodes of u take
at least ⌈|V |/2⌉ vacancies. According to (1), there
are at least ⌈|V |/2⌉ vacancies which cannot be oc-
cupied by v’s neighbor nodes. On the other hand,
the maximal number of vacancies for v’s neighbor
nodes is |V | − 1 in theory. Therefore, the number
of remaining vacancies for the neighbor nodes of v
are smaller than ⌈|V |/2⌉. However, v’s neighbor
nodes need no less than ⌈|V |/2⌉ vacancies, since
d(v) ≥ ⌈|V |/2⌉. This means that v’s neighbor
nodes have to occupy at least one of the vacan-
cies such as aj , which is forbidden for v’s neighbor
nodes. Then nodes in aj and aj+1 form the node
pair 〈x, y〉 we need.
Appendix B: Theorem 2
Theorem 2: For any node s in the network, if d(s) ≥
⌈|V |/2⌉ (Dirac constraints), d(s) is the degree of s, V is
the node set of the network, then the node z in step (5)
of HPA exists.
Proof : Assume there is no such node z that connects
the circle, then the circle is an independent subgraph of G
(the whole network), which means the circle is separated
from G-circle. Suppose there are n0 nodes in the circle.
For any node i in the circle, d(i) ≤ n0 − 1. For any node
j in G-circle, d(j) ≤ (|V | − n0) − 1. Then d(i) + d(j) ≤
|V |−2, which means d(i) or d(j) is less than ⌈|V |/2⌉.This
contradicts the constraints.
Appendix C: Analysis of space and time complexity
We assume that an undirected and unweighted graph
is denoted by G〈V,E〉, V is the node set, and E is the
edge set of the graph. Suppose n = |V |, m = |E|, and
p = [m/n] indicates the density of the graph. Obviously
0 ≤ p ≤ n.
1) Random path augmenting approach
RPA is a simple algorithm for augmenting a path.
Obviously it has O(n) space complexity. For one iter-
ation, RPA runs in O(n) time, in the worst case. Also,
the number of iterations of the longest-path attacks is
at most O(n). Let us assume the number of itera-
tions is T , the length of the resulting path in the i-
th iteration is Ai (Time complexity is O(Ai)). Since,
m =
∑T
i=1Ai, we obtain the total time complexity for
RPA is O(A1) +O(A2) + ...+O(AT ) = O(m).
2) Hamilton-path based augmenting approach
HPA runs in O(n) space in the worst case. Time com-
plexity for one iteration is O(n2). The number of itera-
tions is at most O(m). Assume the number of iterations
is T , the length of the explored path in the i-th iteration
is Ai. Then the time complexity for the i-th iteration
varies from O(Ai) to O(A
2
i ). Since m =
∑T
i=1 Ai, we
obtain that the overall time complexity TC that satisfies
the following constraints of quadratic programming:
(1) 0 < T ≤ m;
6(2) 0 < Ai ≤ n, i = 1, ..., T ;
(3) m =
∑T
i=1Ai;
(4) TC = O(
∑T
i=1 A
2
i ).
When the distribution of Ai is extremely uneven, HPA
has the worst time complexity, which is calculated as
follows:
TC = O(
T∑
i=1
A2i )
≤ O([m/n] ∗ n2 + (T − [m/n]))
= O([m/n] ∗ n2)
= O(p ∗ n2) (C1)
According to eq. C1, we obtain the following conclusions:
(1) The worst time complexity is irrelevant with the
number of iterations of attacks, and it only depends
on network scale and network density.
(2) The worst time complexity for one iteration is
O(n2). For many iterations, the total time com-
plexity grows at most by an order of O(p) magni-
tude, obviously O(p) ≤ O(n) ≤ O(m).
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